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Introduction
In most societies, the space occupied by civil society 
has evolved as part of a dynamic process of adaptation 
and change and in the course of evolution has altered 
its character and composition. Gaps have opened up, 
new opportunities have appeared and voluntary bodies 
have taken up different roles and started to perform 
them in different ways, in part, in response to shifts in 
the external environment such as the modification of 
the role of the state and markets (Deakin 2001). In 
particular, the institutions with which they interact 
have also been in a state of flux.
In general, the retreat of the state – a common 
phenomenon in developed welfare countries – has left 
spaces to be filled, where the functions that it previ-
ously performed and still need to be discharged are 
located. The voluntary sector in Western countries has 
been spotlighted as an alternative candidate for the 
task of taking on these responsibilities on behalf of the 
state. Due to priorities of national economic competi-
tiveness in the period of neo-liberalism, the universal 
idea of social welfare to cover the whole population in 
the beginning of the Western welfare states has been 
increasingly sidelined by the introduction and expan-
sion of social insurance system that is eligible to only 
those who could pay contributions, and the pubic wel-
fare expenditure has been partly reduced by attracting 
the welfare service delivery organised by voluntary 
organisations. It is in this historical context that we 
can witness the institutional settings initiated by the 
government for the purpose of its cooperation with the 
voluntary sector for more effective welfare provision 
(i.e. the government-voluntary sector partnership, the 
introduction of quasi-market, etc.). Accordingly, it can 
be argued that the rapid expansion of voluntary organ-
isations in the Western welfare system took place in 
line with the dismantling of the welfare state since the 
mid-1970s.
In contrast, the government-civil society relation-
ship in South Korea (hereafter, Korea) has undergone 
the different developmental path of the welfare system 
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after the advent of the financial crisis of 1997: the par-
alleling growth of the public and the voluntary sector 
in dealing with social welfare. As well known, before 
the financial crisis, the public social expenditure in 
Korea along with other East Asian countries was much 
less than that of its European counterparts. This 
observable fact results from the history of the Korean 
welfare state in which economic development was the 
overwhelming concern, taking priority over social 
protection (Kwon 1995). Most of welfare programmes 
put less weight on general elements of welfare provi-
sion from the government than the national project of 
economic development. The state as a ‘regulator’ of 
welfare provision came up with general consensus that 
made more than half of the Korean population support 
the notion that individuals should be responsible for 
their own welfare (Shin 2000: 104), and the family-
based or the community-based welfare delivery was 
mobilised by the state as one of the driving welfare 
providers to fill the gap stemming from the low public 
spending for social welfare. However, the civil protest 
against the authoritarian government on the 10th of 
June in 1987 played a significant role in shifting the 
status of civic organisations from the dependent 
groups on the public sector to the independent advo-
cacy and countervailing powers. In addition, the 1997 
financial crisis was the imperative watershed where 
the voluntary sector could partake in social welfare 
reform movements and expand its role as welfare pro-
vider in filling the empty space left by the state’s 
economic mismanagement. These two historical 
events forced the Korean government to launch a new 
welfare slogan ‘Productive Welfare’ following a series 
of welfare reforms that seem to discard the character-
istics of the ‘developmental welfare’. In consequence, 
unlike many OECD countries where the public author-
ity has tried to reduce the size of its government and 
social spending in particular and it has encouraged 
voluntary activities to provide social welfare service, 
the Korean government has expanded the scope and 
commanded an increasing bulk of their public financ-
ing, and it has also emphasised the ‘partnership with 
civil society’ that seems to reflect the growing power 
of the voluntary sector.  
Indeed, Korea has witnessed a rapid expansion of 
the welfare state since the economic crisis of 1997. 
Much of the Korean literature on the expansion of the 
public welfare programmes jumps at a conclusion that 
the Korean government changes its role for social pro-
tection from the previous ‘regulator’ to the active 
‘provider’ to the extent of the welfare state in the 
Western Europe (Kim 2002). However, if we look at 
this hasty conclusion in more depth, we can find out 
that the government is still regulating the public wel-
fare system and furthermore, using civil society as the 
supplementary provider of social welfare service. It is 
not only because despite the relative increase of the 
public social expenditure, the level of the public 
spending in Korea still remains much lower than that 
of most OECD countries, but because the Korean gov-
ernment is marshalling the private transfers from 
voluntary welfare organisations through the political 
rhetoric of the ‘government-civil society partnership’. 
By adopting this paralleling expansion of the public 
and the voluntary sector for welfare provision, the 
government could skilfully deal with two different 
problems coming from the financial crisis: the accom-
modation of growing demands for social welfare from 
the population under the economic disasters, namely, 
social integration; and the mobilisation of the private 
transfers from civil society to fill up gaps that the gov-
ernment should do as the welfare provider. In this 
sense, it is fair to state that the Korean government 
commenced social welfare reforms and embraced civil 
society as not the state of ‘provider’ but the state of 
‘shadow regulator’.
The explosive growth of voluntary organisations 
since the late 1980s gave crucial impacts on the 
changes of the government’s welfare policy. To begin 
with, the nation-wide political advocacy organisations 
such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD) and the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice (CCEJ) has played a central role in 
agenda setting for welfare reform and in the enactment 
process of the key laws stipulating the National Mini-
mum Living Standards. While advocacy groups took 
on political campaigns for welfare reform, many vol-
untary organisations have been involved in social 
welfare provision conducted by the Community Chest 
of Korea (CCK) that includes wide ranges of social 
sectors such as the government, the business, media, 
trade unions, academia, the religious groups, and civic 
organisations. The nation-wide CCK has been symbol-
ised as the meaningful product of social cohesion 
based on social consensus but in reality funds col-
lected from civil society by the CCK support partly 
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the public assistance that the government should pro-
vide. Although it can be suggested that the voluntary 
sector in Korea makes contributions from the political 
pressure for welfare reforms to the implementation of 
welfare provision in mixed economies of welfare, this 
janus-faced feature of voluntary organisations results 
in the conflicting tension between advocacy voluntary 
organisations and conventional social welfare agen-
cies. Moreover, the internal tension in civil society 
enables the government to function as ‘shadow regula-
tor’.
This paper seeks to explore causal links of devel-
opmental paths between the welfare state and the 
voluntary sector in Korea in order to verify three 
hypotheses presented below, with the particular 
emphasis on a question why the Korean government 
needs and allows the expansion of the voluntary sector 
in dealing with the welfare problems in the aftermath 
of the economic crisis.
(1)  The expansion of the government intervention 
in the area of social welfare does not necessar-
ily indicate that the government reinforces the 
role as the ‘provider’ of welfare service. 
(2)  The explosive surge of the voluntary sector and 
its associated social welfare reform movement 
are not necessarily equalised with the retreat of 
the state welfare.
(3)  Social welfare reform movements do not neces-
sarily demand the increased scale of welfare 
provision and coverage from the government.
Given these hypotheses, the rest of the paper consists 
of the three-fold sections: the first part briefly touches 
on academic discourses on the characteristics of the 
Korean welfare system; the second part deals with the 
evolutionary development of the voluntary sector and 
the inner weaknesses of voluntary organisations; and 
the last part analyses how the Korean government in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis set in motion insti-
tutional adaptations to the changing society in order to 
regulate adeptly social unrest resulting from the radi-
cal economic restructuring, and mobilise the private 
transfers from civil society.
Debates on the Characteristics of the 
Korean Welfare System
Before the financial crisis of 1997, the East Asian 
combination of low public spending on welfare with 
economic dynamism was praised in the West by left- 
and right-wing politicians alike, albeit for different 
reasons⑴. Several studies have already tried to make 
sense of East Asian welfare systems, adopting histori-
cal, cultural or political economy approaches. 
Catherine Jones (1993: 214) characterizes the East 
Asian welfare state as the ‘Confucian welfare state’ 
with the accent on “conservative corporatism without 
(Western-style) worker participation; subsidiary with-
out the Church; solidarity without equality; laissez-
faire without libertarianism: an alternative expression 
for all this might be ‘household economy’ welfare 
states and run in the style of a traditional, Confucian, 
and extended family”. Criticising her cultural deter-
minism, Roger Goodman et al. (1998) offer a 
comprehensive and up-to-date review of large litera-
ture by noting that while they share certain common 
features, East Asian welfare systems are not homoge-
neous and one should be cautious about over-
simplif icat ion. Nevertheless, the three core 
characteristics – limited to three East Asian countries: 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan – are spelled out as general 
understandings of the East Asian welfare state: family 
welfare that appears to negate much of the need for 
state welfare; a status-segregated and somewhat resid-
ual social insurance based system; and corporate 
occupational plans for core workers (Goodman and 
Peng 1996).
However, after the crisis, scholars have begun to 
focus on the inadequacy of East Asian social safety 
nets and the needs for strengthening them with public 
money. Applying six factors⑵ as the analytic standards 
to East Asian welfare systems, Didier Jacobs (2000) 
concludes that the evidence allows putting some con-
ventional statements about the virtues of East Asian 
welfare states into questions, and public expenditure 
on welfare are bound to rise a lot in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. The mainstream of scholarly researches on 
the East Asian welfare state seems to accept the shift 
of the state role from negative regulator to active pro-
vider of welfare provision. However, this section 
examines whether or not this hasty assessment is 
applicable to the Korean case by looking at the exist-





There seems to be no objections to the argument that 
Korean social policy before the financial crisis of 1997 
has been more strongly shaped by the developmental 
priorities of politically insulated states (Deyo 1992; 
Kwon 1995, 1997; Shin 2000). For instance, Industrial 
Accident Insurance was chosen as the first social wel-
fare programme by the Park Chung Hee (in office 
1961-1979) government in 1962. This programme was 
regarded as an essential requirement for a country 
embarking on an ambitious economic development 
plan. In the case of National Health Insurance, indus-
trial workers employed in big business were the first 
group of people to be protected while the more vulner-
able were left unprotected. It was also clearly shown 
that economic growth was given overwhelming prior-
ity in policy making when the National Pension 
Programme was first considered in 1973. The National 
Pension Programme was seen as an effective measure 
for mobilising the capital much needed for economic 
development. In this policy paradigm, the economic-
pragmatists had dominated social policy making until 
the economic crisis of 1997. Most of the incumbents 
of presidency strongly supported the economic-prag-
matists’ approach since they wanted to enhance their 
weak political legitimacy through economic perfor-
mance (Kwon 1995). Given the authoritarian 
institutional setting in which the president and his 
bureaucratic authorities occupied the most effective 
point of decision for the imperative purpose of the 
maintenance of legitimacy, it was very difficult for 
different voices to be heard in policy-making (Kwon 
2002). As in Europe historically and now, political 
factors played and play an important role in account-
ing for social policy development (Kuhnle 2002). On 
the other hand, the emergence of occupational welfare 
in Korea is also interpreted as the main instrument of 
social protection formed within a framework of the 
authoritarian state’s policy of integrating economic 
development, labour control, and social welfare (Hong 
1996; Yi 2007). This pattern of social policy have 
determined the path of occupational welfare develop-
ment in the private sector, which has been influenced, 
shaped and constrained by institutions resulting from 
government policies. During this period of economic 
development, the Korean welfare state can be predom-
inantly characterised by the notion that the main role 
of the state was performed as ‘regulator’ for social 
welfare institutions.
Productive Welfare
President Kim Dae Jung’s vision of a system of ‘Pro-
ductive Welfare’⑶ elaborated in his Liberation Day 
speech in August 1999 was made against a back-
ground of a serious financial crisis. The vision of 
productive welfare suggests a blue print for social 
welfare that spells out why and how a balanced and 
harmonious interaction of democratic, market, social 
and cultural forces can provide a model for a desired 
future Korean welfare society (President Secretariat of 
Republic of Korea 1999). It is argued that only the 
interplay of institutions and forces can overcome the 
economic crisis and provide a sustainable future wel-
fare society (Kuhnle 2002). Unemployment grew 
rapidly and peaked at more than 8 per cent in early 
1999, and more than one million Koreans were thrown 
into poverty. The unemployment rate rose to 6.8 per 
cent in 1998, from less than 3 per cent before 1997, 
and it was expected to keep rising due to the massive 
layoff scheduled by the restructuring of public sector 
and big business corporations (OECD Observer, Octo-
ber 2000). It is also worth noting that there was a 
sweeping change in the public perception of the role 
of the state in social welfare over this period. Accord-
ing to the survey research conducted twice in May 
1997 and in October 1998, 83 per cent of the respon-
dents replied that the state was responsible for 
citizens’ social welfare in 1998, whereas 49 per cent 
responded in that way in 1997 (Shin 2000). Therefore, 
social impacts of the financial crisis made state 
responsibility for social welfare enhanced consider-
ably, and facilitated plans for further improvement in 
coverage and benefits of social insurance schemes to 
be formulated. The Kim Dae Jung administration gave 
impetus to reform policies on income maintenance 
programmes for the unemployed and the poor, in the 
public health care system, including the reform of 
National Health Insurance and the policy for redefin-
ing the work of health care professionals, and in the 
National Pension Programme (Kwon 2002). 
Whereas pursuing the labour market reform based 
on the IMF prescription for restructuring, the Kim’s 
government introduced a package of social policy, the 
‘Master Plan for Tackling Unemployment’, to deal 
with unemployment and protect the unemployed 
(Kwon 2002: 8). In this regard, the Employment Insur-
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ance Programme has been extended to small-scale 
workplace to cover the newly unemployed amidst the 
economic crisis. In addition, a new income support 
programme for the poor was enacted: the Minimum 
Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG) would give bene-
fits to those below the poverty line, increased to a 
much higher level than previously defined. It also 
aimed to cover the wider population of the poor. The 
health care system was also reformed during the 
period of 1998-2000 (Kwon 2001). A quasi-govern-
mental agency was set up to manage integrated 
National Health Insurance, and the fundamental divi-
sion of health care professionals between physicians 
and pharmacists was redefined.
On the face of it, these active reform manoeuvres 
under the political rhetoric of productive welfare lead 
us to assume that Korea is rapidly building the founda-
tions of a modern welfare state, to the similar level of 
many OECD countries. Stein Kuhnle (2002) evaluates 
in this venue that “a reading of the vision on produc-
tive welfare gives rise to the impression that the type 
of welfare system in Korea is one which holds the 
potential of pushing Korea more in the direction of a 
social democratic, Scandinavian type of welfare 
regime” (Kuhnle 2002: 16). It is simply because pro-
ductive welfare emphasises a stronger state 
commitment to welfare, so that all citizens should be 
covered by government welfare schemes, social inte-
gration, and democratic participation. His perspective 
can be easily developed into the argument that the 
main role of the welfare state in Korea is shifted to 
‘provider’.
This assessment of productive welfare can be 
commonly found in the literature containing debates 
on what is the driving force behind social welfare 
reforms in the wake of the economic crisis. Globalism 
enthusiasts argue that the extent to which the state 
becomes involved in shaping economic activities is 
determined by the pressures of globalisation (Lee 
1999). Contrary to expectation, to the globalist’s argu-
ment of the dismantling of the welfare state by the 
logic of globalisation, the Korean welfare state seems 
to develop towards a more redistributive and compre-
hensive welfare sys tem, not l imi ted to the 
establishment of a social safety net described by the 
IMF’s prescription. However, they assert that it will 
come as less of a surprise to those who are familiar 
with the work of Dani Rodrik, who argues that there is 
a highly significant correlation between openness and 
the growth of social protection (Rodrik 1997). On the 
other hand, some scholars counter-argue that the ongo-
ing development of the social security system is 
mainly attributable to domestic institutional changes 
rather than external shocks to the economy (Shin 
2000). That is, new policy networks characterising a 
tripartite corporatism together with growing social 
demands for social welfare have led to reforms. What 
we can catch up from these debates is that in spite of 
different approaches to the Korean welfare develop-
ment in the aftermath of the financial crisis, they all 
seem to agree with the same assumption that the 
expansion of the welfare state means that the state’s 
role as ‘provider’ of welfare service is much more 
reinforced.
However, Huck-Ju Kwon (2002) poses an impor-
tant question regarding the expansion of the welfare 
state in Korea. The question is why Korea has 
extended its welfare state, at a time when neo-liberal 
ideology has been predominant in public policy dis-
course in Korea and abroad. Moreover, he strongly 
points out that these reforms went beyond the func-
tional minima necessary to cope with social problems 
caused by the economic crisis. Adopting political fac-
tors as the main variables, Kwon cautiously 
presupposes that over-expansion of the welfare state in 
the wake of the financial crisis indicates not the state 
as provider of social welfare, but the temporary policy 
for the victory of the presidential election in 1997 and 
the general election in April 2000. At this historical 
juncture, welfare reforms were essential policy for the 
government to mitigate social unrest and the unem-
ployment rate in support of winning elections and 
maintaining its political legitimacy. The failure to win 
the general election in 2000 manifested the thrust of 
reform beginning to lose its momentum. In a nutshell, 
his approach to productive welfare implies the nega-
tive side of welfare reforms for which we cannot come 
to a hasty conclusion that the Korean welfare state is 
identified as the welfare provider. Yet, like most of the 
literature, he pays less attention to influences of the 
voluntary sector on welfare reforms that I will focus in 
this paper.
The State as Provider or Regulator?
From the beginning of 2000, the hot debates on the 
role of the Korean welfare state have been ignited by 
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Korean academia in the division of social policy, with 
a special reference to change or continuity of the fea-
tures of the welfare state resulting from a series of 
welfare reforms in the aftermath of the economic cri-
sis of 1997. Although there is no clear consensus on 
the identity of the Korean welfare state, there seems to 
be no dissenting opinion to the notion that the correla-
tion between social welfare delivery and public 
expenditure depends upon the nature of state responsi-
bility for social welfare. According to writer’s 
perspective located at a certain point of a wide spec-
trum of the state responsibility, the state’s role for 
social welfare could be described in a different way. 
These debates can be largely summarised by the three 
clusters.
First, welfare reforms in Korea have to be under-
stood as the expansion of state responsibility for 
welfare provision to the people (Kim 2002). The pro-
ponents of the idea of productive welfare claim that 
President Kim’s welfare reforms apparently embarked 
upon the expansion of the state welfare, accepting the 
universal rights of social welfare to the level of the 
West. Second, a series of welfare reforms pursued by 
the Korean welfare state is the product of the struc-
tural adjustment tuned by neo-liberal market principles 
(Cho 2002). Most reforms took place in the line with 
the expansion of insurance programmes in which 
social welfare can be distributed to only those who can 
pay contributions (Tang 2000)⑷, and restrictively 
increasing were the amount and scale of the Public 
Assistance Programme that the government should 
take responsibility for. Consequently, the outward 
appearance of welfare reforms is viewed as the mas-
sive expansion of the state welfare, but in reality, the 
policy of productive welfare put less weight on the 
extension of social security nets. That is, it cannot be 
said that the state as provider of social welfare was 
firmly established after the economic crisis. Third, 
some scholars try to elaborate their argument between 
these two extreme perspectives. They admit that wel-
fare reforms based on the expansion of the application 
scope of insurance programmes and social consensus 
through the tripartite committee could be defined as 
the expansion of state responsibility (Jung 2002). Nev-
ertheless, the intention of social integration by the 
institutional adaptation has been undermined by the 
low level of the public expenditure allocation and by 
the continuous emphasis on the neo-liberal logic of 
welfare-to-work (Lee and Yeo 2001). Therefore, the 
state plays a restrictive role in providing welfare ser-
vice under the unstable mixture of the expanded state 
welfare and neo-liberal reforms.
For the analysis of the change of the state’s role 
in dealing with social welfare, most of the literature, 
as I mentioned before, pays much heed to the correla-
tion between social welfare service and the degree of 
the expansion of state responsibility, taking other sec-
tors such as the voluntary sector into less account. 
More examination on the relationship between the 
public sector and other sectors might help to redefine 
the state’s role in the post-IMF period. On the basis of 
the debates on welfare reforms that are explored so 
far, I will move over to the position and functions of 
the voluntary sector in order to verify a hypothesis that 
the expansion of the voluntary sector does not auto-
matically result in the dismantling of the welfare state, 
and rather, it might be employed to identify the state 
as ‘shadow regulator’ of welfare provision. 
The Evolution of the Voluntary Sector 
in Korea
As well known, the existing literature related to social 
welfare systems in Korea has paid little attention to 
the roles of the voluntary sector in social policy-mak-
ing and the output to be implemented by its presence. 
The plethora of scholarly debates on the nature of the 
Korean welfare state has shed much more lights on 
state- or market-oriented perspective as a main analyt-
ical tool. Even among few studies about the voluntary 
sector, its roles and influence on social welfare seem 
to have been exaggerated and over-highlighted with 
no regard to its inherited limits because the voluntary 
sector such as non-profit organisations is so regarded 
as a new attractive factor that can be academically 
commercialised. Furthermore, it is not easy to exam-
ine the voluntary sector in Korea, because it is 
traditionally mixed with the informal sector (family, 
relatives, etc.), such that there is no clear boundary 
between the two sectors (Hong 1999).⑸ Therefore, 
this section consists of the fragmental sources mainly 
collected from literature coping with the general per-
spectives on civil society or civic movement in Korea. 
Adopting the methodology of the historical chronicle, 
I depict how the voluntary sector has evolved and 
developed to transform itself from marginal actor to 
active actor in social welfare issues.
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The Authoritarian Developmental Period 
(1961-1987): the Marginalist-Instrumental 
Approach
During the authoritarian developmental period, in gen-
eral, the voluntary sector played an instrumental role 
in providing welfare service and a marginal role in 
claiming more expanded welfare provision from the 
government sector. As many Western scholars desig-
nated, the private and informal support alongside 
welfare systems the government operated assisted the 
reduction of the public social expenditure, and the 
family- or the community-based welfare provision, in 
itself, seemed to negate the demands for more welfare 
services from the public sector. Social demands for 
welfare provision had been controlled by the great 
cause of economic development as well as the authori-
tarian government capsulated by the developmental 
ideology. In a nutshell, the voluntary sector in this 
period remained as the instrumental provider of social 
welfare, which was totally controlled and manipulated 
by the government.
The Park Chung Hee government who had force-
fully come to power by means of military coup d’état 
in May 1960 faced poverty and increasing unemploy-
ment. In response, the government decided to utilise 
resources from foreign private aid organisations which 
had been running social relief operations in the coun-
try. Despite strong opposition from international aid 
organisations, the Korean government used grain and 
other basic materials to maintain political legitimacy 
of a new regime and to enhance the government’s con-
trol over private welfare institutions and their 
efficiency by launching the Central Committee for Aid 
Activities (Yi 2007: 84-86). The period of the 1960s is 
characterised by ‘aid economy’ under the international 
circumstance of the Cold War, and social welfare poli-
cies was highly controlled by the government that 
implanted the ideology of economic development and 
anti-Communism into population (Kim 1994).
In the 1970s, Korea had experienced the rapid 
economic growth and the prosperity of the big busi-
ness conglomerates that were on the frontline of the 
export-oriented industry in Korea. The economic 
growth enabled the government to consign welfare 
responsibility to private firms. Therefore, the firm-
based welfare system became a major institutional 
framework for social welfare, and the voluntary sector 
became involuntarily involved in welfare provision 
programmes made by private funds and designed by 
the big business conglomerates (Hong 1996). Still, 
given that the private firms were under the control of 
the authoritarian developmental government, the hier-
archy in implementing social welfare provision was 
institutionalised in the order of the state – firms – vol-
untary sector. 
The Fifth Republic established by another mili-
tary coup d’état in 1980 began to restructure the 
institutional system of social welfare delivery under 
the name of a new slogan – the ‘Achievement of 
Social Justice’ (Yi 2007). The government monopo-
lised the agenda-settings of social policy and pushed 
the leaders of the big business conglomerates to sup-
port the government programmes financially. The 
government created the quasi-voluntary organisations 
to work for the government-sponsored welfare pro-
grammes (Hong 1999: 139). A number of social 
welfare organisations tailored to the government poli-
cies were established to play an instrumental role in 
dealing with welfare provision, and they took root in 
Korean society so firmly that until now they have 
strong conservative influences on activities of volun-
tary organisations, thereby making conflicts with new 
social welfare movements (Lee 2001). Over the whole 
years of the authoritarian developmental period, the 
instrumental role of the third sector contributed to two 
interrelated objectives of the government: to enhance 
political legitimacy of the government for social wel-
fare, and to mobilise the financial support and labour 
forces from the third sector – families and communi-
ties – fitting for the government plans of social policy.
The Democratisation Movement of 1987 
(1987-1997): the Growth of Political 
Advocacy Organisations
Ever since the work of Karl Mannheim, historical 
social scientists have hypothesised that epochal water-
sheds have their biggest influence on the outlooks of 
society. This is true of Korean society in June 1987. 
The democratisation movement starting on 10th of 
June 1987 reformulated the status of the voluntary 
sector from the passive taker of social policy made by 
the government to the proactive maker of welfare pro-
grammes. The trade unions and their associated social 
organisations took initiatives of social movement to 
reform the diverse welfare-related projects that had 
been deeply embedded in the authoritarian regime, 
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ranging from the employment insurance programme to 
the national secure minimum standard of living (Moon 
2002). Accordingly, the scope of roles covered by the 
voluntary sector was expanded from filling the gap 
instead of the government to creating new social wel-
fare issues. However, the role of the voluntary sector 
in this period seems to be limited to social welfare 
related to political inequality, because the firm-based 
economy still had strong influence on occupational 
welfare.
In this period, we can witness two significant 
changes in the third sector that give important implica-
tion to the research on the role of the voluntary sector 
in welfare provision. First of all, the voluntary sector 
began to become separate from the informal sector. 
The voluntary sector became to independently pro-
mote democracy by facilitating solidarity and fostering 
the development of civil society. Social movements 
could shape a distinct area of social activity between 
individuals and the primary group of the family, on the 
one hand, and the state on the other. Korean society 
has undergone the age of civil and social movement 
‘explosion’, which is similar to the world trend as Les-
ter Salamon (1994) has described. Indeed, the number 
of articles titled ‘civil or social movement organisa-
tions’ which were put on four major newspapers 
(Chosun, Joongang, Donga, and Hankook Ilbo) during 
the late 1980s was 91 only (Joo and Nam 2001). How-
ever, the number increased by 20 fold up to 1,710 in 
the early and mid-1990s. Therefore, a thriving volun-
tary sector is seen as an indispensable component of a 
civil society and of a democratic political system in 
Korean society.
Secondly, two important nation-wide civic organ-
isations were voluntarily formed after the civil protests 
for democratisation in 1987. In 1989, the CCEJ in 
1989 was founded in response to the problematic side-
effect of rapid economic development, claiming that 
in this process, equitable distribution of wealth has 
been forgotten and the social rights of people has been 
gravely damaged. Also, in 1994, the PSPD was 
founded as a civil organisation dedicated to promote 
political justice and human rights through participa-
tion of the people. For the most part, they either acted 
to raise issues for government attention by campaign-
ing for policy suggestions in support of numerous 
projects for the unemployed and the poor. Growing 
political power of civil society could force the govern-
ment not to ignore voices and demands from voluntary 
organisations, and thereby, make it impossible that the 
government regulates and controls the voluntary sec-
tor in order to replace, in part, the role of welfare 
provision on behalf of the government. However, it 
seems that at this historical stage, the voluntary activ-
ity was limited to the political advocacy role at either 
local level or national level (Shim 2000: 42). Func-
tions as social welfare provider can be hardly found in 
newly rising voluntary organisations in this period, 
such that we can assume that some parts of welfare 
provision have been still maintained by the informal 
sector and quasi-voluntary sector steered by the gov-
ernment or the big business conglomerates.
The Economic Crisis of 1997 and Social 
Welfare Reform Movement: the Paralleling 
Expansion of the Voluntary and Public 
Sector
The financial crisis in 1997 was portrayed as another 
crucial turning point for the voluntary sector. The 
resulting effects of economic mismanagement fatally 
undermined capacities of the government and firms as 
welfare providers, and yielded the massive layoff and 
de facto collapse of social security service. Under this 
circumstance, civic organisations could boost their 
voice in much wider range of social welfare agenda, 
especially economic sector: social security nets – the 
national pension, the reform of social insurance, the 
reform of medical insurance programmes, etc (Shim 
2000). It was the voluntary sector that took part in 
providing welfare services for the homeless, and the 
destitute by voluntarily mobilising the charitable funds 
from social network (Kim and Ryoo 2000). The gov-
ernment responded to the demands from the voluntary 
sector by taking measures of launching a new institu-
tional cooperation: the ‘Government-Civil Society 
Partnership’ in which all sectors discuss social policy 
issues and the following means of more effective 
implementation. This shows that the main role of the 
voluntary sector after the financial crisis was expanded 
into making a bridge between the government and the 
local people by participating in social policy-making.
Korean scholars evaluate this historical shift as 
the product resulting from the failure of the develop-
mental welfare system. Jin-Young Moon (2002: 6) 
points out that “as the myth of economic development 
has collapsed, the Korean government was not able to 
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grasp the policy point to tackling the unprecedented 
social problems, and turned out to be incapable of run-
ning social programmes effectively”. It can be further 
argued that these social programmes can hardly be 
successful even if they actively introduce new 
schemes and allocate vast amount of budget to these 
programmes. On the other hand, adopting Karl 
Polanyi’s idea in his classic work The Great Transfor-
mation as a main theoretical tool to analyse the growth 
of the voluntary sector, Kyung-Joon Hong (1999) 
states that the livelihood of man in Korea after the 
economic crisis would be reorganised and comple-
mented by ‘reciprocity’ through self-help system 
operated by the voluntary sector, in that ‘redistribu-
tion’ mechanism by the government and ‘exchange’ 
mechanism by the market are proven malfunctioned. 
His emphasis on the complementary role of the volun-
tary sector is put in the similar line with Stanley Katz’s 
suggestion that “civil society must be thought of as a 
process and a state of mind – a social process that gen-
erates trust and mutual understanding and mediates 
state and market pressures or failures” (Katz 1999: 
37). For the most part, these reviews on the rapid 
increase of voluntary organisations and their influ-
ences to welfare provision seem to indicate that the 
government leaves to voluntary associations functions 
that elsewhere and at other times have been performed 
by the state, as the public sector, allegedly, lost both 
roles of regulator and provider. However, as Theda 
Skocpol (1996) warns against the Republicans and 
their theoretical supporter, Robert Putnam, we need to 
realise that pitting voluntarism and charity in zero-sum 
opposition to the government is too hasty policy-mak-
ing⑹. I t i s s imply because the government 
institutionally adapted itself to the changing society, 
and called for the participation of voluntary associa-
tions in dealing with welfare issues under the political 
rhetoric of ‘Partnership with Civil Society’ based on 
the goals of ‘Productive Welfare’.
Given academic analyses presented in the above, 
we can draw two crucial insinuations necessary to 
explain the relationship between the voluntary sector 
and the government after the financial crisis. Firstly 
and most importantly, it is very interesting to note that 
the voluntary sector in Korea continued to grow in the 
parallel with the expansion of the public welfare 
schemes, contrary to Salamon’s survey (1994: 110) 
showing that the voluntary sector in Western world is 
thriving in consequence of the development of the 
welfare state. This double-track expansion can be 
viewed as mutual understandings of close symbiosis, 
in that the government has to expand the public wel-
fare expenditure in order to reduce or prevent social 
unrest stemming from the economic disaster, and at 
the same time the government needs the voluntary 
participation of civic organizations to fill gaps result-
ing from the expanded welfare schemes that it plans to 
implement. In consequence, it can be argued that the 
role of the government is located in somewhere 
between provider and regulator. In addition, we now 
know that the correlation between the expansion of 
voluntary organisations and the retreat of the welfare 
state may be differently verified in different contexts. 
In the second place, there is an unintended trend 
of the division of labour within the area of civil soci-
ety in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Alongside 
advocacy activities lasting since the democratisation 
movement of 1987, a number of voluntary organisa-
tions either at the national base or at the local base pay 
great attention to activities of social welfare provider 
in order to overcome the high rate of unemployment 
and the shortage of subsidies for the poor by means of 
fund-raisings from generous individuals in collabora-
tion with mass media or the public agencies (Chung 
2001). Whilst political advocacy groups strongly par-
ticipate in campaign for welfare reforms as social 
forces against the government, voluntary organisations 
undertaking social welfare delivery have room for 
working with the government. This would be the 
cleavage within the voluntary sector that might bring 
about tensions between the two different styles of 
organisations when they cope with the problems of 
welfare reforms.
For the part of political advocacy for welfare 
reforms, we can take a typical example of the volun-
tary solidarity in the enactment process of the MLSG. 
In March 1999, the PSPD and the CCEJ took the ini-
tiative of organising the ‘Solidarity for Enactment of 
the MLSG’ consisting of 64 major Korean civic 
organisations such as the Korean Council of Trade 
Unions, the Federation of Korean Trade Union, the 
Representative Council for the Religious, the Lawyers 
for Democratic Society, and so on (Moon 2002: 7-8). 
The Solidarity achieved the successful outcome to 
enact the law of the MLSG by actively participating in 
the enactment process of the MLSG in four stages: (1) 
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issue making, (2) agenda setting, (3) policy alterna-
tives, and (4) decision-making (Ahn 2000). Whilst a 
series of social welfare reforms launched by the Kim 
Dae Jung government may be appraised as an epoch-
making, it is noteworthy that the process of such 
reforms is totally different from the previous pro-
cesses. In general, it was the government that designed 
and proposed a new law and then the parliament 
examined and decided. It was thoroughly a govern-
ment-centred process, and thus there has been no room 
for voluntary organisations. In contrast, these social 
welfare reforms under the Kim Dae Jung government 
have been strongly influenced by advocacy organisa-
tions, which have played a key role from the agenda 
setting and proposing policy alternatives, to the final 
enactment (Ahn 2000: 18-19; Kwon 2002: 13). The 
reasons why the two major nation-wide advocacy 
organisations (the PSPD and the CCEJ) have acted 
independently for social welfare reforms can be found 
from three features of internal composition of those 
organisations. First, organisations are composed of the 
regional branches, which means that they are able to 
systemically mobilise human resources for campaign-
ing at the national level. Second, one article of their 
internal regulations stipulates independent fund-rais-
ing and its autonomous allocation, and proscribes any 
funds from the public sector. Lastly, all staffs are full-
time activists or a group of progressive or somewhat 
leftist scholars. Based on independent principles of 
activity, the PSPD and the CCEJ have played a signifi-
cant role in pushing the government to expand the 
public social expenditure and hampering the govern-
ment from regulating welfare system arbitrarily.
On the other hand, the voluntary sector in Korea 
plays a key role in terms of fund-raising as well as 
welfare services, in particular, in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. The voluntary sector contributions to 
the statutory social welfare bodies consist of voluntary 
donations, statutory bodies’ own proceedings, and the 
Community Chest for social services (Chung 2001). 
Additionally, a number of local-level voluntary organ-
isations are working for self-employed programmes 
that they set up voluntarily in order to trim down the 
high rate of unemployment (Jin 2001: 199-201). Those 
voluntary activities are supplementary or complemen-
tary roles for welfare service that the government 
should provide. Overlapping activity between statu-
tory agencies and voluntary organisations enables the 
government to collaborate with the voluntary sector or 
to consign welfare services into the area of civil soci-
ety. The Community Chest of Korea (CCK) is the best 
example to explain how voluntary organisations tak-
ing on welfare provisions are organised and operated. 
Taking over the government-conducted community 
chest drive, the CCK was established in November 
1998 as a social welfare organisation according to the 
Community Chest Law (CCL). According to the 
Clause 2 of the CCL, the main goals of the CCK are to 
raise donations on a national level, and to set up local 
funds to support social welfare projects (Yoon 2000: 
256). Despite the voluntary identity prescribed by the 
CCL, the fundamental nature of operational principles 
returns the CCK into a pro-government organisation. 
Most of all, most famous figures in every sector of 
Korean society (the former or present cabinet mem-
bers, the incumbent parliament members, two major 
trade unions, conventional social welfare organisa-
tions, and so on) are involved as full-time or part-time 
staffs in making decisions on how to allocate funds 
and how to choose welfare projects proposed by local 
voluntary organisations. Furthermore, the Korean first 
lady, Lee Heui Ho, is now acting as one of co-repre-
sentatives in the CCK. Although the composition of 
main staffs gathered from all sectors of society may 
symbolise the CCK as a paragon organisation for 
social integration, the allocation of funds is more 
likely to be made by the policy-direction of the gov-
ernment. It is also noteworthy that the CCK has 
introduced the contract system in selecting some vol-
untary projects that will be funded in order to make 
voluntary candidates competing each other (Kim and 
Ryoo 2000). In a nutshell, the Korean government 
institutionalises quasi-voluntary organisation in order 
to facilitate welfare provisions not directly through the 
public sector, but through the voluntary sector, and 
thereby broadens the room for acting as indirect regu-
lator.
As mentioned before, this unintended division of 
labour exposes voluntary organisations to conflicting 
tensions between political advocacy organisations and 
conventional social welfare organisations. It may be 
mainly because the advocacy groups have tended to 
see conventional agencies as one of the reform targets 
(Lee 2001: 1). It is also partly because their ideologi-
cal orientation is somewhat different from that of 
social welfare organisations, for example, ‘income 
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strategy’ oriented vs. ‘service strategy’ oriented (Lee 
2001: 7). More importantly, political advocacy organi-
sations regard social welfare organisations as client 
groups mobilised by the government. Consequently, 
this conflict is a structural impediment for the volun-
tary sector in Korea to raise united voices for welfare 
reforms to the government.
The State as ‘Shadow Regulator’: 
Institutional Adaptation for Social 
Integration
Given the exploration of the evolutionary development 
of voluntary organisations, we can learn why the gov-
ernment needs the voluntary sector contributing to 
welfare service provisions, and how the government 
indirectly regulate civil society. In particular, the gov-
ernment adapts itself to social demands for welfare 
reforms by the introduction of new institutional set-
tings such as the welfare rhetoric ‘Productive Welfare’ 
encapsulated by partnership with civil society, the 
linkage between the voluntary sector and self-
employed programmes, and the enactment of the CCL. 
The state’s goals in pursuit of the institutional adapta-
tions are largely categorised by the following benefits.
The Mobilisation of the Private Transfers
It is widely accepted among scholars of social policy 
that speed and contents of the social welfare reforms 
under the Kim Dae Jung government are surprisingly 
epoch-making, compared with those in previous gov-
ernments. Recent social welfare reforms entail the 
massive expansion of the public welfare expenditure. 
Indeed, the public social expenditure in Korea has 
been increased from 3.90 per cent of GDP in 1996 
before the economic crisis to 5.94 per cent of GDP in 
1998 after the crisis (table 2). However, the level of 
the Korean public spending is still tremendously lower 
than that of other OECD countries. At this point, we 
can raise an important question: how can over-
expanded welfare schemes that are evaluated as the 
similar level of welfare systems in Western countries 
be financed for effective implementation? The correct 
answer may be located in the area of the voluntary 
sector. 
Despite their limited capacity and ambiguous 
boundary with the informal sector, voluntary organisa-
tions in Korea have traditionally played a great role in 
providing private transfers for the poor and the unem-
ployed, which have contributed to facilitate the 
redistribution of income as well as modify income 
inequality (Kwon 1998). According to Kwon’s re-esti-
mation (1998: 476), private transfers account for 15 
per cent of the market income of the poor. In the same 
venue, it is quite worth mentioning Ian Gough and J. 
Kim’s research (2000) revealing that the total level of 
welfare expenditure in Korea at 22 per cent of GDP is 
much closer to the likely OECD average than if public 
spending alone is considered. They conclude that 
Korea has a genuinely mixed system of welfare, with 
the public and private sector, all playing a notable role 
(Gough and Kim 2000: 6). In other words, the govern-
ment can make up for the large amount of welfare 
expenditure by mobilising the private transfers. If we 
look at the way of fund-raising and its allocations of 
the CCK in more depth, this operational mechanism 
can be clearly confirmed. First, staffs with various 
affiliations are easily able to collect donations from all 
sectors such as enterprises, mass media, the religious 
Table 1.　Comparison of Three Major Nation-Wide Voluntary Organisations in Korea
People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy 
(PSPD)
Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice (CCEJ)
Community Chest of Korea 
(CCK)
Sphere of Activity National (8 branches) National (32 branches) National (16 branches)
Feature of Activity Advocacy (Political issues) Advocacy (Economic issues) Social welfare provider
Fund-raising Voluntary Voluntary Quasi-voluntary
Allocation Voluntary Voluntary Quasi-voluntary
Composition of Staff Civil Activists & Academics Civil Activists & Academics Politicians, Bureaucrats, 
Religious Orgs, Trade 
Unions, Media, Civic Orgs, 
Firms, Lawyers, etc.
Sources: Author’s classification from www.pspd.org, www.ccej.or.kr, and www.chest.or.kr.
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charities, and so on. Second, the fund allocation is 
chiefly focused on  living expenses and health costs in 
support of the poor (replacing the Public Assistance 
Programme in part) that are equivalent to over 50 per 
cent of the total fund, as well as on self-employed 
projects (replacing the Public Works Projects in part) 
that are equivalent to 33.5 per cent (table 3). Some 
scholars criticize that the government has been utilis-
ing donations collected from the people for the 
purpose of supporting the public welfare schemes, 
rather than expanding social welfare budget (Kim and 
Ryoo 2000: 433-435). Accordingly, the Korean gov-
ernment effectively mobilises the private transfers 
from the voluntary sector in order to manage over-
expanded public welfare programmes.
Supplements of the Public Works Projects
To dealing with the high rate of unemployment, the 
Kim Dae Jung government extended the Employment 
Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation to all 
employees. The government also launched the Public 
Works Projects, targeting at those people, who were 
outside of the Employment Insurance Programme and 
the Public Assistance Programme (Kwon 2002: 9-11). 
In other words, this programme was for those unem-
ployed who were not eligible for unemployment 
Table 2.　Comparison of Public Social Expenditure of OECD countries
Measure: As % of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Denmark 29.32 30.17 30.72 32.35 33.06 32.41 31.69 30.66 29.81
Finland 24.78 29.91 33.92 33.88 33.04 31.24 30.97 28.72 26.54
France 26.45 27.09 27.88 29.34 29.07 28.98 29.31 29.27 28.82
Germany 20.29 24.17 25.56 26.37 26.19 26.70 28.06 27.74 27.29
Italy 23.87 24.33 25.52 25.73 25.45 23.75 24.38 24.94 25.07
Japan 10.80 10.94 11.45 12.07 12.67 13.47 13.91 14.32 14.66
Korea 3.16 2.96 3.25 3.33 3.38 3.67 3.90 4.27 5.94
Mexico 3.23 3.58 3.93 4.24 4.68 7.44 7.54 8.02 8.22
Netherlands 27.92 28.10 28.56 28.76 26.85 25.92 25.29 24.88 23.90
New Zealand 22.53 22.56 22.40 21.02 19.90 19.32 19.67 20.76 20.97
Norway 26.00 27.15 28.41 28.13 27.95 27.62 26.48 26.16 26.97
Sweden 31.02 33.18 36.39 36.66 35.21 33.03 32.99 32.26 30.98
United Kingdom 21.62 23.41 25.75 26.46 26.10 25.84 25.79 25.33 24.70
United States 13.36 14.41 15.11 15.36 15.34 15.41 15.30 14.93 14.59
Source: www.oecd.org
Table 3.　The 1999 Fund Allocation of the Community Chest of Korea
Unit: 10,000 won
Number of supported 
proposals Supported amount Percentage
Support of living expenses 19 3,038,908 45.8%
Support of health costs 13 421,670 6.4%
Programs
Counselling 36 636,659 9.6%
Self-employed projects 81 2,229,898 33.5%
Publicity activities 6 99,044 1.5%
Sub-sum 123 2,965,601 44.6%
Support of facility operation & renovation 12 211,145 3.2%
Total sum 167 6,637,321 100.0%
Source: Internal Document of the National Association of the Community Chest (1999). Recited from Kim and Ryoo (2000).
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benefits and at the same time not poor enough to get 
public assistance benefits. They were not eligible for 
public assistance benefits, simply because the means 
testing of the Public Assistance Programme was very 
strict in Korea. The Public Works Projects provide a 
work force for social service and charity organizations 
such as community centres and welfare institutions 
(Jin 2001). This sort of work is by and large consigned 
to voluntary organisations based on the local commu-
nity. As table 3 shows, the nation-wide voluntary 
organisation also allocates its funds to the programme 
of self-employed projects. Hence, the government puts 
voluntary organisations to practical use for the partial 
replacement of the Public Works Projects. That is, as 
Ralph Kramer classifies (1981: 234), the voluntary 
sector supplements or extends the governmental sys-
tem with similar services, some of which may offer an 
alternative choice or serve a substitute for a govern-
mental service.
When the government selects voluntary agencies 
as the substitute of the Public Works Projects, it adopts 
the introduction of the quasi-market system for pro-
moting competition. The quasi-markets arrangement 
involves a process of separation of state finance from 
state provision of welfare services, alongside the intro-
duction of competition in the provision of services 
between independent agencies (Le Grand and Bartlett 
1993). The institutional setting of contracting relation-
ship with voluntary organisations makes the voluntary 
sectors reliant on the public funds, thereby facilitating 
the government to play a key role as ‘shadow regula-
tor’.
Agencies for Social Integration
The fundamental rationale of the state’s institutional 
adaptation to accommodate the voluntary sector into 
the area of welfare service converges to one general 
objective: social integration in the very unstable his-
torical juncture when the economic failure produced 
massive lay-offs and the malfunctions of social secu-
rity nets. For this purpose, large portion of the political 
rhetoric of productive welfare emphasises partnership 
with civil society and the revival of community spirit 
through voluntary organizations. By mobilising the 
private transfers, consigning the unemployed to self-
employed programmes operated by local communities, 
and assembling various social forces into a huge-sized 
voluntary organisation, the government is able to 
reduce the public social expenditure, to cut down the 
high rate of unemployment, and to achieve the great 
cause of social cohesion. Very radically speaking, vol-
untary organisations can be seen as agencies of the 
government working for social integration. Therefore, 
unlike Kuhnle’s evaluation, the role of the welfare 
state in Korea in the aftermath of the economic crisis 
shifted from ‘explicit regulator’ to ‘shadow regulator’ 
in coping with welfare issues.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this essay, I posited three hypothe-
ses, with the particular weight on a question why the 
Korean government needs and allows the expansion of 
the voluntary sector in dealing with the welfare prob-
lems in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Through 
analysis of the historical development of both the 
Korean welfare state and the voluntary sector, it can 
be found that the Korean government has called for 
voluntary organisations in order to relieve financial 
burden stemming from over-expanded public welfare 
schemes, as well as to consign self-employed projects 
to local communities. The CCK is the typical volun-
tary organisation tailored to the government’s goal of 
social integration. The expansion of the public welfare 
programmes does not mean that the government pro-
vides the whole coverage of the public expenditure. 
Instead, it manages the public expenditure by mobilis-
ing the private transfers from other social sectors. 
Consequently, the first of hypotheses stands con-
firmed.
As we explore in the earlier sections, the develop-
ment voluntary sector in Korea is generally 
characterised by the rapid growth of the number and 
scale in parallel with the expansion of the public wel-
fare programmes. It is the developmental path of the 
voluntary sector different from that of Western coun-
tries which have experienced the expansion of the 
voluntary sector in the consequences of the retreat of 
the state welfare. This phenomenon fundamentally 
results from close symbiosis based on mutual needs 
between the public and the voluntary sector after the 
economic crisis of 1997. The Korean context verifies 
the possibility of paralleling expansion of the volun-
tary sector with the welfare state. Therefore, the 
second of hypotheses stands correct.
Civil society has Janus-faced elements that can be 
very flexibly fitted to different conditions. The Korean 
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voluntary sector is largely composed of the two differ-
ent types of voluntary organisations: political 
advocacy groups and social welfare organisations. 
Whilst advocacy organisations undertake the political 
campaigns and the suggestion of policy alternatives 
against the government-conducted welfare pro-
grammes, conventional social welfare organisations 
are more likely to collaborate with the government by 
receiving the public funds through contracting. This 
conflicting relationship between voluntary organisa-
tions produces dissonant voices that would be 
weakening the power of the voluntary sector when 
they demand welfare reforms to the government. In 
this regard, the third of hypotheses stands confirmed 
as well. 
The second and the third hypothesis are finally 
reduced to the first hypothesis. The government facing 
the financial crisis needed the support of the voluntary 
sector, simply because the state- and the market-based 
welfare provision collapsed, and therefore, it allowed 
the expansion of voluntary organisations. The conflicts 
within voluntary organisations enable the government 
to regulate conventional social welfare organisations 
very easily, and the government accommodates social 
welfare organisations into the government-funded 
projects in order to mobilise human resources and 
financial resources from the voluntary sector. In a nut-
shell, all hypotheses confirm their convergence to the 
first one: the role of ‘shadow regulator’.
NOTE
⑴　The British Labour Party primarily regards East Asia as 
instructive in its emphasis on the role of government in stim-
ulating economic growth and maintaining social cohesion, 
while the Conservative Party cites the same area of social 
welfare in support of an image of an enterprise society based 
on low levels of government expenditure and individual reli-
ance (White and Goodman 1998).
⑵　Six factors are analysed based on aggregate data: the pub-
lic/private mix of welfare programmes, the age structure, the 
maturity of old-age pension schemes, the population cover-
age of social security, the relative generosity of social 
security and the role of enterprises ad families as alternative 
providers of welfare (Jacobs 2000).
⑶　The office of the presidential aides published a well-writ-
ten book which explains the idea and policy of productive 
welfare. It summarizes a number of problems and concerns 
forming the background for this welfare ideology, and the 
goals of productive welfare (President Secretariat of Repub-
lic of Korea 1999).
 (i)  Problems and concerns: deteriorating social integration; 
poverty in the outskirts of urban areas; inequality in the 
distribution of income and wealth; regional imbalance in 
the distribution of resources; weak rights and interests of 
the socially underprivileged; old age pension coverage 
for people who have not paid contributions; high rate of 
unemployment; protection of needs of people outside 
the labor market; monopolistic tendencies in business-
government collusion; globalization and high labor costs 
 (ii)  The goals of productive welfare: develop a welfare sys-
tem that nurtures both growth and equitable income 
distribution; reach consensus between the government, 
the market and civil society; revive community spirit 
through civic organizations; develop a local-community 
based system of welfare; fair, equitable distribution of 
wealth; active policy of welfare through work; increased 
socio-economic participation; more comprehensive 
social security system that covers the entire population; 
increase the percentage of total government spending on 
social welfare; raise taxes for high-income earners; con-
stitutional recognition of social welfare as a basic human 
rights; develop social participation programs; increase 
opportunities for participation of women; strengthen the 
protection of children’s living standards; strengthen the 
role of the private sector and of civic groups and volun-
tary associations; reduce socio-economic disparities 
among nations in the East Asia region; advance global 
harmony.
⑷　For example, in 1998, the Korean government extended 
the Employment Insurance Programme (EIP) to cover those 
previously outside the programme and loosened its eligibility 
requirement for unemployment benefits to take up people 
who were made unemployed. Although a great number of 
people benefited from this reform, this effort was not very 
effective in helping the unemployed previously in working in 
small-scale workplaces and informal sectors. It is because the 
EIP required to pay a premium first, even if the minimum 
period of contribution was reduced to six months. In other 
words, the EIP was still of no use for the unemployed who 
had not previously paid unemployment contributions.
⑸　The short history of civil society and voluntary organiza-
tions in Korea and the blurring of boundary between the 
voluntary sector and the informal sector lead Korean scholars 
to use the term, ‘third sector’ instead of the voluntary sector. 
It seems to be made so as to embrace all elements consisting 
of civil society for more convenience when we explain some-
thing about the voluntary sector. Although I need more 
research for the clear definition of the voluntary sector tai-
lored to the Korean situation, I use the term ‘voluntary 
sector’ in general in this essay, except some cases when I 
spell out voluntary agencies that are confused or mixed with 
the informal sector.
⑹　Skocpol criticises many conservatives’ rhetoric, “return to 
the Tocqueville files”, in that the United States has never had 
much of a centralised welfare state like the Western Europe, 
and instead, the federal and state governments have often 
subsidised and acted in partnership with the efforts of volun-
tary, religious, and nonprofit agencies. In this regard, she 
emphasises the role of the state, by stating that “Organised 
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civil society in the United States has never flourished apart 
from active government or in opposition to government and 
politics” (1996: 7).
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